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LIMITING STRICT LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTAL
DEFENDANTS: THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
OF THE 1985 LEGISLATION
When Loescher v. Parr' introduced strict liability under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2317 for the custody of defective things, few could
have foreseen the far-reaching implications it would have with respect
to the liability of state and local governments. Four years after Loescher,
the Louisiana Supreme Court first held a municipal defendant strictly
liable under article 2317 in Jones v. City of Baton Rouge.2 The possibility
of such strict liability claims prompted fears for the fiscal well being
of state and local government in a time of escalating insurance rates,3
which in turn moved the legislature in 1985 to enact several bills 4 limiting
governmental liability. Among them was Act 454, enacting Louisiana
Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 9:2800, which provides:
A. A public entity is responsible under Civil Code Article
2317 for damages caused by the condition of buildings within
its care and custody.
B. Except as provided for in Subsection A of this Section,
no person shall have a cause of action based solely upon liability
imposed under Civil Code Article 2317 against a public entity
for damages caused by the conditions of things within its care
and custody unless the public entity had actual or constructive
notice of the particular vice or defect which caused the damage
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976).
2. 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980).
3. One illustration of these fears is a report stating: "For the municipalities covered
by the liability insurance program of the Louisiana Municipal Risk Management Agency
(the insurance component of the [Louisiana Municipal Association]), claims based on strict
liability alone averaged 30 percent of all claims paid for in 1981-1984." 2 La. Mun. Rev.
5 (March-April 1985).
4. These bills included Act 450, which enacted La. R.S. 13:5114(D) providing for
structured payment plans in certain circumstances; Act 451, which enacted La. R.S.
42:1441.1 through 1441.4 and La. R.S. 29:23.1 establishing interlocal risk management
programs and limiting the master-servant liability of the state; Act 452, which reenacted
La. R.S. 13:5106 and 5109(A) limiting the amount recoverable in personal injury and
wrongful death suits against the state to $500,000, not including medical care and past
and future earnings and/or support; Act 453, which enacted La. R.S. 9:2798.1 precluding
liability of public entities or their employees for the performance of discretionary acts;
and Act 509, which amended and reenacted La. R.S. 13:5112 and 5117 providing for court
costs and interest on suits against the state or its political subdivisions.
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prior to the occurrence, and the public entity has had a rea-
sonable opportunity to remedy the defect and has failed to do
SO.
C. Constructive notice shall mean the existence of facts which
infer actual knowledge.'
This comment will examine this statute from three perspectives: the
need for this type of legislation, the possible constitutional problems,
and the alternatives to this legislative solution available within the context
of Louisiana law on tort liability.
I. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
Assessing the need for this legislation requires an examination of
the development of article 2317 liability. The Louisiana Supreme Court
in Loescher set out the elements of an article 2317 claim: (1) the existence
of a vice or defect (i.e., an unreasonable risk of injury to another), (2)
the defendant's custody of the defective thing, and (3) damage resulting
from the vice.6 At the same time, the court recognized three defenses
available to defeat such a claim: "[Tihe owner or guardian . . . can
escape liability only if he shows the harm was caused by the fault of
the victim, by the fault of a third person, or by an irresistible force.",
The court based this form of liability not on the negligent conduct of
the defendant, but rather on his legal relationship to the risk-creating
thing.
The extent of governmental liability prior to the enactment of La.
R.S. 9:2800 turned, then, upon the jurisprudentially defined parameters
of a "vice" or "defect." In Jones v. City of Baton Rouge,8 the plaintiff
was injured when she stepped onto a catch-basin cover which collapsed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish
the duty on the part of the city necessary to support a claim of
negligence, because "a municipality has a duty to correct a dangerous
street or highway condition - where that condition was not actually
caused by the negligence of its own employees - only if it has actual
5. Subsections D & E provide:
D. A violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by a public entity is
not negligence per se.
E. "Public entity" means and includes the state and any of its branches,
departments, offices, agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers,
officials, employees, and political subdivisions and the departments, offices,
agencies, boards, commissions, instrumentalities, officers, officials, and em-
ployees of such political subdivisions.
6. 324 So. 2d at 446-47.
7. Id. at 447.
8. 388 So. 2d 737.
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or constructive notice of the existence of the condition." 9 Nevertheless,
the court found that she had adequately established the elements of
liability urider article 2317: the municipal defendant had custody of the
catch-basin cover, a defect therein caused plaintiff's injury, and "the
risk of falling four or five feet into a catch-basin as a result of stepping
upon a presumably solid, firm metal surface is unreasonable."'10
The decision in Jones produced fears that governmental defendants
would be subject to virtually unlimited liability for things in their cus-
tody. Nevertheless, just one year later, the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Shipp v. City of Alexandria" demonstrated that liability will not au-
tomatically result from an injury on governmental property. The court
emphasized that "[t]he fact that Mrs. Shipp fell does not elevate the
condition of the street to that of an unreasonably dangerous vice or
defect.' 2 Specifically, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to
show "that the area in the street where Mrs. Shipp fell was a defect
in the sense that the risk of falling and suffering an injury due to this
imperfection in the street pavement was so unreasonable as to justify
the imposition of non-negligent liability."'"
Although the court in Shipp did not fully explain its rationale, the
result can perhaps be understood in light of the balancing approach
utilized by the supreme court in two cases not involving governmental
defendants. In Hunt v. City Stores, Inc.,' 4 a products liability case, the
court compared negligence and article 2317 liability, finding that both
incorporate the concept of unreasonableness in a balancing approach:
In both negligence and strict liability cases, the probability and
magnitude of the risk are to be balanced against the utility of
the thing. The distinction between the two theories of recovery
lies in the fact that the inability of a defendant to know or
prevent the risk is not a defense in a strict liability case but
precludes a finding of negligence.'"
The court employed this same kind of balancing test in Entrevia v.
Hood, 6 where it found the owner of a rural farmhouse to be free from
liability under articles 2317 and 2321 for injuries sustained by a tres-
passer. The court once again compared negligence with article 2317
liability:
9. Id. at 739 (citing Pickens v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 323 So. 2d 430
(La. 1975)).
10. Id. at 740.
II. 395 So. 2d 727 (La. 1981).
12. Id. at 729.
13. Id.
14. 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980).
15. Id. at 588.
16. 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
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[I]n both delictual areas the judge is called upon to decide
questions of social utility that require him to consider the par-
ticular case in terms of moral, social and economic considera-
tions, in the same way that the legislator finds the standards
or patterns of utility and morals in the life of the community."
The court in Entrevia focused on the thing that creates the risk
and its relative value in terms of social utility. In contrast, the
Hunt test merely imputed knowledge to the defendant and then
measured his conduct under a reasonableness standard. Perhaps
the difference can be explained in that Hunt was a products
liability case whereas Entrevia presented a pure custodial issue
under articles 2317 and 2321.
In several cases, the courts of appeal have used a balancing approach
to refuse to hold a governmental defendant strictly liable when the social
utility of the thing outweighed its risk. In Goodlow v. City of Alex-
andria,' for example, the plaintiff's car was damaged when it struck
an uncovered manhole. Citing Hunt, the court found the risk not un-
reasonable. The court balanced the extremely high utility of manholes
against the remote possibilities that "vandals ... might ... remove
the cover, or that a heavy vehicle might . . . strike the cover in precisely
the wrong way and kick it off."' 9 In sum, because of the high utility,
the low risk, and the fact that "there was no crack, design error, or
other imperfection in the manhole or its cover," 20 the balance was struck
in favor of the defendant. Although the court cited Hunt, it did not
choose to employ the imputed knowledge standard of that case. Instead,
it emphasized balancing the risk of the defective thing against its utility,
thus anticipating the Entrevia approach.
In Jones v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans,2' the plaintiff
was injured when she stepped into a drain clean-out hole in a sidewalk.
The fourth circuit recognized the balancing approach used in Goodlow,
but reached a different result. The court found that the easy removability
of the cover constituted an unreasonable risk of harm.2 2 The court
17. Id. at 1149-50. The court in Entrevia also rejected the approach of Kent v. Gulf
States Utilities Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982), which had added to the elements of an
article 2317 claim an examination of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. Entrevia
brought the jurisprudence back into line with Loescher by making the focal point of the
inquiry the defendant's legal relationship with an unreasonably dangerous thing and not
the defendant's conduct. See Note, Entrevia v. Hood: Back to Loescher v. Parr, 44 La.
L. Rev. 1485 (1984).
18. 407 So. 2d 1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
19. Id. at 1308-09.
20. Id.
21. 430 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 438 So. 2d 573 (La. 1983).
22. Id. at 1065.
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distinguished Goodlow on the ground that the drain clean-out had not
been used for years, thus altering the equation so that the risk of injury
outweighed the utility of the cover. 23 Although both the manhole cover
in Goodlow and the clean-out cover in Jones provided access for main-
tenance purposes, the cover in Jones had a much lower social utility
because of its nonuse.
More recently, the fourth circuit in Landry v. State24 found that
the Levee Board of New Orleans was not liable under either negligence
or article 2317 for plaintiff's injury caused by his attempt to avoid a
partially hidden hole in a lakefront seawall. The court rejected the
negligence claim for lack of the defendant's actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the defect. Citing Entrevia, the court also rejected the strict
liability claim, finding the social utility of the recreational area to be
unquestionable and a requirement of daily inspections for seawall erosion
to be unduly burdensome. 25
Though not exhaustive, these cases indicate a judicial flexibility in
defining the limits of "defect" which arguably makes the statutory notice
requirement in La. R.S. 9:2800 unnecessary. Without this notice re-
quirement, a public entity may still escape the imposition of article 2317
strict liability if it successfully advocates that the social utility of the
thing outweighs the risk that the thing will cause injury. The courts
have treated the issue as one of risk absorption and distribution.2 6 The
additional notice requirements imposed by La. R.S. 9:2800 seem to
speak to the threat raised by Jones v. City of Baton Rouge rather than
to the reality of current jurisprudential standards.
The definition of constructive notice in La. R.S. 9:2800-"facts
which infer actual knowledge"-is unclear, especially in light of the
notice standards utilized in negligence cases. Constructive notice in a
negligence action has been defined as "the fact that the defect . . . had
existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered
and repaired if the public body had exercised reasonable care." '2 7 Li-
kewise, in cases purporting to apply an "actual" notice standard, Lou-
23. But see Rigao v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 467 So. 2d 1263 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 So. 2d 988 (La. 1985) (uncovered meter box); Baker v. Sewerage & Water
Bd., 466 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985) (uncovered water valve box). Both cases
cited Goodlow and found no unreasonable risk of injury.
24. 483 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (on remand), writ granted 488 So. 2d 190
(La. 1986).
25. Id. at 165.
26. See, e.g., Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1150.
27. Bell v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 235 So. 2d 164, 165 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
See also Swain v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 413 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), where
the court found constructive notice of a missing cover to a water meter box in which trash
had accumulated and a neighbor testified that it had been open for over two weeks.
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isiana courts have been willing to infer notice from factual circumstances
such as the mere passage of time.28 That the courts have applied es-
sentially the same test' no matter what standard they claim to use,
indicates that the statutory definition of constructive notice will, in spite
of its ambiguity, in all probability be given the same jurisprudential
parameters currently utilized in negligence cases.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Equal Protection
Even if there exists a need for this kind of legislation, its consti-
tutionality is questionable. State classification schemes are vulnerable to
constitutional challenges, on the basis that they deny equal protection
of the law. Federal jurisprudence presently delineates three distinct stand-
ards of review in equal protection analysis: strict, minimal, and inter-
mediate. Strict scrutiny applies when the classification limits fundamental
constitutional rights or discriminates against persons who are members
of a suspect class. 29 A statutory classification must promote a compelling
state interest to survive this standard of review. Minimal scrutiny, on
the other hand, represents a highly deferential approach to the legislative
branch. Classifications examined under this standard need only be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state goal. Early cases utilized these two
levels of review, but a two-tiered scrutiny was found inadequate to
accommodate the complexity of equal protection problems. Scrutiny that
was supposed to be strict in theory turned out to be fatal in practice,
while minimal scrutiny turned out to be nonexistent in practice.30 As a
result, a third standard emerged: intermediate scrutiny. A classification
will survive this test if it is substantially related to an important gov-
ernmental interest.' Intermediate scrutiny has been used to judge classi-
fications founded on gender and illegitimacy."
28. See Jerry Joseph Fontenot, Inc. v. State, 346 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977), where the court found the defendant negligent for failing to discover and remedy
a missing stop sign which had been down for at least three weeks; and Jones v. Louisiana
Dept. of Highways, 338 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), where the court found the
defendant negligent for failure to discover and/or remedy a dangerous highway defect in
existence for at least two weeks before the accident in question.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778
(1938).
30. Gunther, The SupremeCourt, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. I, 8
(1972).
31. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
32. See Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of
Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161, 163 (1984).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court has found that "[t]he equal protection
guarantee of the constitution essentially requires that state laws affect
alike persons and interests similarly situated."33 Two recent Louisiana
Supreme Court cases support Professor Gunther's observation that strict
scrutiny is fatal to a classification, whereas minimal scrutiny tends to
be no scrutiny at all." Interpreting both federal and state equal protection
guarantees, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Detraz v. Fontana" wavered
between strict and intermediate scrutiny before invalidating a statute
that required a party suing a public official to post a bond for attorney's
fees. The court found that the statute divided tort victims into two
classes-victims of governmental tortfeasors and victims of private tort-
feasors. Only the first class of victims suffered the statutory burden of
a bond for attorney's fees.36 The court noted that, although not apparent
on the face of the statute, racially discriminatory purposes may have
motivated its enactment .17 If so, "[tihe purported purpose of protecting
public officers from litigation brought solely for its harassment value
would not satisfy the requirement of a compelling governmental inter-
est." In addition, the court found that even under the reasonableness
test (intermediate scrutiny), the statute violated equal protection because
no reasonable justification for the statute's disparate treatment had been
supplied.39 Like the statute involved in Detraz, La. R.S. 9:2800 divides
tort victims into those injured by private defendants and those injured
by governmental defendants. The latter have the additional burden of
proving that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the
alleged defect.
Rudolph v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co.,4" a 1985 decision,
illustrates the deferential nature of the minimal scrutiny rationality re-
view. In Rudolph, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a statute under
the federal equal protection standard exempting the state and its sub-
divisions from civil jury trials. The court found no suspect class and
no infringement of a fundamental right since the United States Supreme
Court has declined to incorporate the Seventh Amendment's right to
33. Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276, 278 (La. 1977).
34. See supra note 30.
35. 416 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1982).
36. Id. at 1296.
37. The court cited a legislative joint resolution "to maintain segregation of the races
in all phases of our life." Id. "The statute .. . would further this purpose by making
it extremely costly, if not prohibitive, for minority groups or individuals to bring suit
against any public official . . . for the redress of grievances suffered because of race."
Id. at 1296-97.
38. Id. at 1294.
39. Id. at 1296.
40. 472 So. 2d 901 (La. 1985).
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trial by jury in civil cases into the Fourteenth Amendment. 4' The court
refused to apply intermediate scrutiny because "the classification of
plaintiffs injured by governmental tortfeasors was not the sort of suspect
or quasi-suspect category which would require the courts' heightened
review.' '42 Therefore, the court examined the classification under the
most deferential standard of review, and determined that "the Legislature
could have rationally believed that this classification of tort victims,
who cannot require a jury trial, is related to achieving the legitimate
state objectives of the protection of the state treasury and the facilitation
of the judicial process." 43
The application of different standards of review in Detraz and
Rudolph may be explained by the nature of the private interests at
stake. The effect of the bond requirement in Detraz was to make suits
against public officials prohibitively expensive. The statute in Rudolph,
on the other hand, merely eliminated the jury as fact finder in suits
against the state or its subdivisions. Moreover, appellate review of facts
is available in Louisiana to correct errors made by a judge sitting as
fact finder. 44 Thus, there was a difference in the degree to which the
statutes affected prospective plaintiffs. Because La. R.S. 9:2800 so dra-
matically alters the substantive cause of action for certain plaintiffs, it
arguably deserves the higher level of scrutiny applied in Detraz.
In its most recent foray into the equal protection field, the Louisiana
Supreme Court chose to distinguish the federal and state guarantees.
Echoing much critical commentary, the court in Sibley v. Board of
Supervisors4l expressed dissatisfaction with the federal three-tier ap-
proach. Among the systemic faults which the court noted in the federal
approach were internal inconsistency, rigidity, and an emphasis on ab-
stract standards of review rather than on the merits of the case. 46 The
court chose instead to utilize the equal protection guarantee found in
article I, section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution, 47 which it interpreted
41. Id. at 904-05.
42. Id. at 905. The court noted in footnote 8 that "[c]lassifications such as gender
and illegitimacy have been characterized as quasi suspect and subjected to a middle tier
of scrutiny .... Id. at 904.
43. Id.
44. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985-Louisiana Constitutional Law,
46 La. L. Rev. 535, 551 (1986).
45. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985) (on rehearing).
46. Id. at 1106.
47. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited,
except in the latter case as punishment for crime. La. Const. art. 1, § 3.
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as "going beyond the decisional law construing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 8 The court stood on firm ground in its expansive interpretation
of this provision. As one commentator has reported: "The equal pro-
tection guarantee that emerged [from the Louisiana constitutional con-
vention] is a broad one and was intended to be so. Surely the breadth
of the provision will produce far-reaching changes .... 149
From the tripartite structure of the constitutional text, the court
discerned three types of classifications. First, those based on race or
religious beliefs were banned absolutely. 0 Secondly, classifications based
on the enumerated categories of birth, age, sex, culture, physical con-
dition, and political ideas and affiliations were permissible if the state
could show that the classifications were not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, and that the statute substantially furthered an appropriate
state purpose.5 Finally, a challenge to a classification based on any
other grounds would have to show that the law was unreasonable or
that it did not further any appropriate state interest.52
The plaintiff in Sibley brought a medical malpractice action to
recover damages in excess of the $500,000 statutory limit imposed by
La. R.S. 40:1299.39. 53 Plaintiff asked the court to invalidate this statutory
cap on equal protection grounds. The supreme court remanded the case
for a determination of whether the state could meet the burden of
showing a substantial furtherance of an appropriate state interest, stating:
"[Tihe statutory prohibition against a malpractice judgment in excess
of $500,000 classifies individuals because of their physical condition.
The law on its face ...impose[s] different burdens on different classes
of persons according to the magnitude of damage to their physical
condition. ' '114
In contrast to the few categories warranting the federal middle-tier
scrutiny, Sibley interpreted the Louisiana Constitution as extending
heightened scrutiny to birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, and
political ideas or affiliations. It is unclear just how broadly these terms
will be defined, but potentially their scope could be far reaching.
The classification drawn by La. R.S. 9:2800, unlike that involved
in Sibley, is not according to the quantum of physical injury suffered.
48. 477 So. 2d at 1108 (quoting Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of The Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. i, 6 (1974)).
49. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of The Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1974).
50. 477 So. 2d at 1108.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Act No. 239 of 1985 repealed the limit with regard to the recovery of medical
expenses.
54. 477 So. 2d at 1108.
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Thus, it is unlikely that La. R.S. 9:2800 will be construed as a clas-
sification based on physical condition. Furthermore, none of the other
enumerated categories seems to encompass the limitations imposed by
La. R.S. 9:2800. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that:
The decision to list specific grounds, however, does not mean
the listing is exclusive, for the first sentence provides the general
rule, "no person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws." This paraphrase of the fourteenth amendment gives the
courts the basis for developing the equal protection guarantee
with respect to types of discrimination other than those listed.
Had the grounds for discrimination in the second and third
sentences been meant to be exclusive, those sentences would have
stood alone, and the first sentence would have been superfluous."
Louisiana's equal protection guarantee, therefore, could conceivably be
extended to a plaintiff challenging La. R.S. 9:2800.
If intermediate scrutiny were used to test the constitutional validity
of La. R.S. 9:2800, the state would have to show that the classification
reasonably furthers a legitimate state purpose. 6 Take, for instance, the
person injured by an improperly maintained government automobile,
who would have sustained the same injuries if the car had been privately
owned, but whose cause of action is altered by the notice requirement
of La. R.S. 9:2800. There may well be a justifiable rationale for applying
a less demanding standard of review to cases involving types of gov-
ernmental property which present unique risks not confronted by private
defendants. 7 Such reasoning, however, does not extend to those things
in the government's custody which present equivalent risks to similar
things in private custody. Yet the only exemption in the statute applies
to government owned buildings. Thus, the classification appears to be
based less on the character of the use (and its concomitant risks) than
on the status of the defendant." Because the statute may paint with
too broad a brush, it is questionable whether this distinction between
public and private defendants would survive intermediate level scrutiny
of the connexity between the means employed and the ends sought.
On the other hand, if minimal scrutiny were used, the statute would
likely survive constitutional attack. A challenger would have to dem-
onstrate that the classification is unreasonable or that it does not further
any appropriate state interest.5 9 One possible state interest is a policy
consideration supporting the application of a different standard of 1i-
55. Hargrave, supra note 48, at 7 (emphasis added).
56. 477 So. 2d at 1107.
57. See Hargrave, supra note 44 at 555.
58. But see id.
59. 477 So. 2d at 1108.
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ability for governmental defendants. For example: "Public entities typ-
ically engage in a wide spectrum of activities which have no obvious
private counterparts. Many governmental functions involve inherent ex-
posure to potential injurious consequences far in excess of the risks
normally encountered in the private sector." 6 An additional difference
is that "public entities charged with such duties and responsibilities
cannot simply avoid the risk by refusing to act .... ,,61 Thus, "gov-
ernmental tort liability ... may tend to develop rationally grounded
functional distinctions quite different from those which characterize pri-
vate tort liability systems." ' 62 Apart from these general policy concerns,
the court in Rudolph found that the state has a legitimate interest in
preserving its financial resources and that the prohibition of civil jury
trials against a state governmental defendant prevents "a jury's perceived
inclination to dig deeper into state pockets." 63 Protection of state and
local fiscal coffers could likewise justify La. R.S. 9:2800.
In sum, a court using minimal scrutiny would most probably defer
to the legislative branch, while intermediate scrutiny would pose a much
more difficult challenge to the statutory notice requirement.
Sovereign Immunity
Even if permissible on an equal protection basis, La. R.S. 9:2800
faces greater difficulties under the state constitution as a violation of
the abrogation of sovereign immunity. Article XII, section 10(A) of the
1974 Constitution provides: "Neither the state; a state agency, nor a
political subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability in contract
or for injury to person or property." In defining the reach of this
constitutional provision, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Segura v.
Louisiana Architects Selection BoardP invalidated a statute exempting
the state from payment of court costs. The court determined that to
deny plaintiff recovery of costs "would reduce the value of the award"
and further that "[t]he consequence would be that the state was relieved
of part of its liability. The Constitution makes no such concession. ' 65
The Segura interpretation was supported in Jones v. City of Baton
Rouge where the supreme court refused to exempt governmental defehd-
ants from article 2317 liability and stated that "[i]t is not the function
of the court to create an exception to this unequivocal constitutional
60. Van Allstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. Ill.
L. Forum 919, 922.
61. Id. at 923.
62. Id.
63. 472 So. 2d at 905.
64. 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978).
65. Id. at 499.
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rejection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. ' 66 Finally, the court
in its original opinion in Sibley stated: "Segura struck down the of-
fending statute, only because it attempted to favor the state with a
privilege, that is, exemption from payment of court costs, unavailable
to other defendants in similar suits. ' '67
These cases support: the conclusion that the State is precluded from
granting itself privileges not available to private parties. Because La.
R.S. 9:2800 grants a privilege to the State that is not given to a similarly
situated private party (a heightened burden of proof imposed on plaintiffs
seeking recovery under article 2317), the statute would be constitutionally
impermissible under the reasoning of Segura, Jones, and Sibley.6
III. ALTERNATIVES
The legislature has available various options that might achieve the
goal of La. R.S. 9:2800 and also survive constitutional scrutiny. One
alternative is to amend: Civil Code article 2317, adding a constructive
notice requirement affecting all defendants. This would solve the equal
protection and sovereign immunity challenges, but it would tamper with
the interdependent articles of the Civil Code dealing with tort liability.
Louisiana courts have spoken of the overall fault scheme to be found
in those articles. The judiciary should be entrusted to interpret that
scheme with the flexibility thus far shown in "a balancing of claims
and interests, a weighing of the risk and the gravity of harm, and a
consideration of individual and societal rights and obligations.1 69 The
codal distinction between the fault based liability imposed in a negligence
action and the liability imposed under article 2317 based on one's legal
relationship to things in one's care or custody is well-grounded in the
functional intent of article 2317'o and within the fault scheme of articles
2315 through 2322. To remove a single aspect of article 2317 liability
would threaten the logical consistency of those articles.
A better solution would be to redraft La. R.S. 9:2800 in terms
similar to other sections of Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
66. 388 So. 2d at 740.
67. 462 So. 2d 149, 154 (La. 1985). On rehearing the court found the sovereign
immunity issue to be moot.
68. Nevertheless, there is authority for the proposition that these cases go beyond
the drafter's intent: "In short, the convention did not adopt broad sovereign immunity
in all suits, but it did assume that sovereign immunity existed in some areas. These areas
were never defined." Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Hortatory" Provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647, 650 (1983). See also Murchison, The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Local Government Law, 40
La. L. Rev. 681, 712-13 (1980).
69. Entrevia, 427 So. 2d at 1149 (quoting Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258
La. 1067, 1084, 249 So. 2d 133, 140 (1971)).
70. Loescher, 324 So. 2d at 448.
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which limit liability for property owners. For example, La. R.S. 9:2791
precludes the liability of owners of property used for recreational pur-
poses, absent a showing of willful injury. The third circuit has extended
the liability limitation of this section to governmental entities as well
as to private landowners.' Likewise, La. R.S. 9:2795 provides that
owners of land who permit its recreational use (whether or not a fee
is charged) incur no liability for injury on their land (provided it is not
a commercial facility and excepting a willful or malicious failure to
warn of a dangerous condition). While the appellate courts have extended
these provisions to the state and its political subdivisions, the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Keelen v. State' and Landry v. State' managed to
avoid the issue.
The third circuit, in Pratt v. State,'74 rejected plaintiff's sovereign
immunity challenge to La. R.S. 9:2795. The court stated: "[bly its terms,
the grant of immunity is made to any landowner who has made his
land available for certain recreational purposes. The State, for the pur-
poses of the statute, stands in the same position as would any other
private litigant.""' Similar limits are extended to Mardi Gras krewes
(La. R.S. 9:2796), blood banks (La. R.S. 9:2797 and Louisiana Civil
Code article 2322.1), and donated food (La. R.S. 9:2799). These pro-
visions limit a property owner's duty of care in very specific and narrowly
defined circumstances. In contrast, La. R.S. 9:2800 affects a blanket
waiver of the notice requirement in article 2317 actions against govern-
mental defendants for all things in their custody except buildings. This
approach fails to take into account the character of the uses of such
property or of the risks involved therewith.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the legislature desires to limit governmental liability it should do
so in a manner consistent with both the fault scheme of the Civil Code
and of Title 9. Specific statutory limitations could be drafted regarding
high risk governmental property. To forestall attack on the basis of
sovereign immunity, coverage should extend to private defendants as
well. A strong correlation between those things which present a high
risk of harm and those protected under the statutory scheme should be
sought in order to meet the requisites of equal protection. Thus, in the
interest of public safety, public entities should still bear the burden of
a high degree of care for traffic control devices.76 In all other cases
71. See Thomas v. Jeane, 411 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
72. 463 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1985).
73. 477 So. 2d 672 (La. 1985).
74. 408 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 1098 (La.
1982).
75. Id. at 342.
76. See, e.g., Bernard v. Campbell, 303 So. 2d 884 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
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not covered by a specific liability limit, Louisiana judges possess the
flexibility to take into account special risk situations and to make a
determination as to what constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm.
Linda McKinnis
